Abstract. This paper presents a new algorithm for cryptanalytically attacking stream ciphers. There is an associated measure of security, the 2-adac 8pan. In order for a stream cipher to be secure, its Zadic span must be large. This attack exposes a weakness of Rueppel and Massey's summation combiner. The algorithm, based on De Weger and Mahler's rational approximation theory €or 'Ladic numbers, synthesizes a shortest feedback with cam shaft q w t e r that outputs a particular key stream, given a small number of bits of the key stream. It is adaptive in that it does not neeed to know the number of available bits beforehand.
Introduction
In this paper a new general purpose attack on stream ciphers is presented. This attack can be used successfully, for example, against Rueppel and Massey's summation combiner [16, 191. All future stream cipher designers will need to consider resistance to this attack.
The 'development of cryptosystems tends to alternate between the design of new systems that resist known attacks, and the design of new attacks against systems. Often such attacks are highly specialized and only work against particular systems. Occasionally a very general attack is found that can potentially be used against a large class of cryptosystems. Examples include differential cryptanalysis, which can be used against many round based block ciphers such as DES, [l] , and the BerlekampMassey algorithm [15] , which can be used against stream ciphers. Sometimes we can numerically measure the extent to which c r y p tosystems resist a particular attack. This is the case with the BerlekampMassey algorithm: the h e a r span of a binary sequence S is the size of the smallest linear feedback shift register (or LFSR) that generates S. The higher the linear span of a sequence, the greater the resistance to the BerlekampMassey algorithm when S is used as the key in a stream cipher. Thus when a cryptographer designs a new stream cipher, it is imperative that she show that the key stream has large linear span.
As with the BerlekampMassey algorithm, the method of cryptanalysis described in this paper has an associated measure of security, the &a& span. There is a precise way in which the BerlekampMassey algorithm can be thought of as a rational approximation algorithm in the ring of power series with integer coefficients. Simiiarly, the new attack can be thought of as a rational approximation algorithm in the ring of 2-adk integers. The BerlekampMassey algorithm is closely related to continued fractions [3, 4, 13, 17, 221. Over the 2-adic numbers, however, continued fractions fail to converge in general. The algorithm presented here is based on Mahler and De Weger's lattice theoretic substitute for 2-adic continued fractions [12, 211 . Unlike Mahler and De Weger's approach, our algorithm is adaptive. The number of known bits of key stream does not need to be determined before the algorithm can be executed. Another nonadaptive 2-adic rational approximation algorithm was discovered by Gregory and Krishnamurthy Recall that a stream cipher is a private key system in which the message, a binary sequence, is encrypted by adding it bit by bit modulo two to a key stream, which is another binary sequence. The key stream is known to the legitimate receiver of the message who can thus recover the message by adding the key to the ciphertext. Individual stream ciphers are defined by the manner in which the key is generated. A cryptosystem (or the associated key) is secure if the message cannot be determined by an eavesdropper who does not know the key.
A cryptosystem is generally only considered secure if it is secure against a known plaintext attack. In the case of stream ciphers, this means that an eavesdropper should be unable to determine the key even if part of the key is known.
For an attack to be practical, it must also be possible for the eavesdropper to generate the key at a rate commensurate with the rate at which it is generated by the sender of the message. The power of the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm is that it produces a description of a fast device -a short LFSR -that generates the key, if such a device exists. Recently, a new class of feedback registers, feedback with carry shaft registers or FCSRs was developed "7, 91. These registers are designed to quickly output the 2-adic representation of a rational number. Moreover, they have associated with them a number of algebraic structures that are analogs of the algebraic structures used to analyze linear feedback shift registers. When FCSRs were originally described by Klapper and Goresky, no adaptive, provably convergent algorithm was known for synthesizing FCSRs from short prefixes of eventually periodic sequences. The algorithm described in this paper fills this gap. It proceeds in two stages. The eavesdropper is assumed to have access to the first few bits of the key stream ao,, al, .. A rational approximation algorithm (described in Section 3) is used to find the best rational approximation p / q to the 2-adic number cy = Cz-, ~r i 2~. This approximation will be best in the sense that, for all approximations that are accurate modulo a particular power of 2, the maximum of IpI and 141 is as small as possible. We show that if in fact cy is rational, cy = pf/q', then our rational approximation algorithm finds the reduced rational representation of Q if [2log(max(lp'l, lqfl))l + 2 bits are known (see Theorem 6). This is approximately twice the size of the smallest [GI.
FCSR that generates the key (see Corollary 8 ) . Thus the rate of convergence of our algorithm is analogous to that of the BerlekampMassey algorithm. The complexity of our algorithm is U(T2 log T log log T ) , where T is the number of known bits. This exceeds the complexity of the BerlekampMassey algorithm only by the log factors. Once the rational representation of a is found, there is a fast algorithm for finding an initial loading of a FCSR that outputs a. This is described in Section 4.
It follows that any key stream that can be generated by a small FCSR (or euivalently, whose associated 2-adk number is a rational number p / q , with ( P I and IqI small) leads to an insecure stream cipher. This fact gives rise to a security measure. The idea of cryptanalysis using FCSRs is that if a key stream can be generated by a short FCSR, and we can determine this FCSR efficiently from a small subsequence of the key stream, then we can construct an efficient generator for the key stream. It may not be the same device that was originally used to generate the key stream, but this is immaterial to the cryptanalyst. Thus in order for a stream cipher to be secure, its key stream must have large 2-adic span. In the conclusions we describe the effect on the security of a well known key stream generator, the summation combiner [16, 191. 
Review of Feedback with Carry Shift Registers
In this section we describe FCSb and some of their basic properties. Details of the construction and results in this section may be found in [7, 91.
F C S h are based on division in the ring of 2-adic integers. Recall that a 2-adic integer is a series CEO a,ai, ai E (0, l}, where we have replaced the indeterminate z by the integer 2. Addition and multiplication are defined term by term as for ordinary integers. The set of 2-adic integers forms a complete valued ring ZZ. The ordinary rational numbers intersect Z2 in the set of rationals with odd denominator or, equivalently, in the set of 2-adic integers whose sequence of coefficients is eventually periodic. See [ll] for background on 2-adic numbers.
Definition2. ([7,
91) The FCSR with connection integer q = -1 + El=, qi2*, qi E (0, l}, is a device with r bits of storage plus an auxiliary memory containing an integer. If the auxiliary memory is m, and the contents of the register consists of the T bits (Qr-1, ~r -2 , . . . , al, ao), then the operation of the shift register is defined as follows:
A l . Form the integer sum 0 = EL=, qkar-k + m.
A2. Shift the contents one step to the right, outputting the rightmost bit ao.
A3.
Place a, = B mod 2 into the leftmost cell of the shift register. A4. Replace the memory integer with m = (0 -ar)/2 = t0/2].
Fig. 1. Feedback with Carry Shift Register
The integer q is referred to as the connection integer because it is the analog of the connection polynomial associated with a LFSR. Notice that 90 = -1 does not correspond to a feedback tap. A FCSR is depicted in Figure 1 .
We have the following facts about FCSRs (1) The algorithm is given in Figure 2 . It is based on Mahler and De Weger's lattice theoretic approach to padic rational approximation [12, 21] , but has the advantage that the number of known bits of a need not be predetermined. Each new bit that is found with certainty leads to a better approximation. The symbols f = (fi, f2) and g = (g1,92) denote pairs of integers. Note that the minimization steps can be performed by a pair of integer divisions. This is explained in more detail in the last paragraph of this section.
To understand the algorithm some notation is useful. For any h = (hl, h2) E
Thus the goal of the algorithm is to find the element of L k with h2 odd and the minimum value of @ over all elements of L k with ha odd. The set Lk is a Z-lattice -a finitely generated module over Z. 5. f minimizes 9 over all elements of Lk with fi and f2 even.
Proof: We prove this by induction. It is straightforward to check that the conditions hold initially.
Let us suppose that the conditions hold at stage k. If g(a) 3 0 mod 2k+1, or equivalently, g E &+I, then it is again straightforward to check the conditions. Therefore, assume g $ ! Lk+1. We treat the case when @(g) < @(f). The other case is similar.
Let f' and g' be the new values after updating. Let c be the odd integer closest to d+ 2b/a. Then ( c -( t i t 2b/a)l 5 ( a -l ) / a .
It follows that

@ ( f + c g ) = @ ( f + ( d C ? ) g + ( c -( d + ? ) ) g )
where we have used the triangle inequality for @, and inductively used the minimality condition on g . This contradicts the choice of d.
5.
Suppose there is an element h' E Lk+l with hi and ha even, such that @(h') < @(f') = 2$(9). We can write h' = 2h for some h E Lk. If both hl and h2 are even, then @(h) < @(g) < @(f) by the inequality in the algorithm leading to this case. This contradicts the minimality of f . If h2 is odd, then
@(h) < @ ( g ) contradicts the minimality of g . It is impossible that hl is odd 0
We observe that point ( 5 ) of the lemma is not strictly necessary for convergence of the algorithm. In fact, the algorithm runs correctly if we always update g and f by the first method of update, independent of the relation between @(f) and @ ( g ) . However, point ( 5 ) ensures that the size of f is small and leads to better bounds on the complexity.
Suppose the input sequence to the algorithm is, in fact, an eventually periodic sequence giving a rational 2-adic a = p / q . We want to know how many iterations of the rational approximation algorithm are required to output @, q). a pair (g1,gZ) satisfying g1 -a g Therefore, 91/92 = p / q . Again by the 9-minimality, we must have gl = p and g2 = Q.
0
It is preferable to bound the number of bits needed by the 2-adic span (the size of the smallest FCSR that outputs a). The 2-adic span is related to 9 by the following. 
It follows that
This gives the desired bound. 
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Now let us show how to construct a FCSR which generates the bit sequence for a given rational number p / q . We assume q is a positive odd integer and let T = Llogz(q + 1)J . Write q = qi2i with qo = -1 and qi E {0,1} for i > 0.
We want to determine the initial setting (including the extra memory) of the FCSR with connection integer q that outputs the 2-adic expansion of p / q . The number of nonzero taps in such a FCSR is t = wt(q + l), the Hamming weight of the binary expansion of q + 1. The initial setting is related to p and q by the following proposition. Furthermore, if we let x = aj2j, then the double sum in equation (3) is the product qx with all products of terms whose indices sum to r or more omitted. Such a double sum can be computed essentially as quickly as the full product qx. It follows that, for a given fraction p / q , the initial loading can be derived by the following steps.
B1.
Compute a0 + a1 2 + . . + ar-12'-* = p / q mod 2p. In general computing modular quotients is apparently hard. However, when the modulus is a power of a prime they can be computed efficiently. It is straightforward to do so in time O(r2).
B2.
Compute y = C;:: C :
, qiak-iak, say by a modified multiplication algorithm.
B3. Compute m = (y -~) / 2~
in time O ( r ) .
-, a,-l m the initial loading and rn as the initial memory in a FCSR with connection integer q. This FCSR will output the 2-adic expansion of p / q . Of course if p and q have been determined by the ratianal approximation algorithm, then we already have the initial loading ao, * * , Or-1 and need only determine the initial memory rn from steps (B2) and (B3).
We can then use ao,
Complexity Issues
Suppose the rational approximation algorithm is executed with a sequence a which is eventually periodic, with rational associated 2-adic number a = p / g . Let X be the 2-adic span of a. Then the rational approximation algorithm takes T = 2X + 2 rlog(X)1 + 4 steps.
Consider the kth step. If g(a) f 0 mod 2'+l, then we say that a discrepancy has occurred. The complexity of the algorithm depends on the number of discrepancies. To simplify the computation of a g 2 , we maintain afi as well. When When T bits of input are used, this form of the algorithm guarantees that both f and g have at most T bits. This follows for g because (a mod 2k, 1) is in L k , and by induction for f since the f at stage k requires at most one nore bit than the maximum required by f and g at stage k-1. The complexity of the algorithm is thus 4 D M + O(T2). Strictly in terms of T, this is U(T210gTloglogT).
However, if the sequence is chosen so the number of discrepancies is small, the complexity is lower. In particular a cryptographer designing a stream cipher should try to choose sequences for which many discrepancies occur.
Conclusions
We have exhibited an algorithm for synthesizing a minimal size feedback with carry shift register that outputs a sequence given a relatively small number of its bits. This is a general approach to attacking stream ciphers, and 2-adic span, the associated security measure, must now be considered whenever cryptologists design stream cipher.
This We might build a summation combiner based on maximal period LFSRs with length about 60. The resulting sequence is certainly secure against the classical BerlekampMassey attack. However, it is only secure against the attack described in this paper if we choose the individual output sequences have 2-adic spans close to their periods.
A slightly different analysis arises if we consider security based on complexity. If we consider a system secure if it takes 260 word operations to crack it, then it must have 2-adic span at least 227. If we allow 270 word operations, the 2-a d k span must be 232. However, the analysis we have given is a worst case analysis. The actual speed of the rational approximation algorithm depends on the number of updates that must be performed. Thus the sequences chosen must not only have large 2-adic span, they must guarantee that many updates occur in the rational approximation algorithm.
Many other questions remain concerning FCSRs and 2-adic span. To understand the average behavior of the algorithm, we are led to the question of how the 2-adic span varies as a random sequence is lengthened. This is closely related to the question of what the 2-adic span of an average sequence is. Experimental evidence suggests that on average the 2-adic span is about half the length of the sequence. This would be consistent with what happens in the case of linear span, and would imply that on average many updates occur in the rational approximation algorithm.
The question of how to generate sequences with large 2-adic span is now an important one. We cannot have secure stream ciphers without such sequences.
In fact we need to be able to generate sequence that simultaneously have large 2-adic and large linear span, Finally, a number of generalizations of FCSRs have been suggested, based on other complete valued fields over number fields [8, lo] . Generalization of the ideas in this paper to padic shift registers (p a prime) is straightforward. Generalizations to registers over ramified and unramified extensions of the 2-adic (or padic) numbers are more difficult. With care, the registers can be constructed and have the appropriate algebraic structures. However, the rational approximation algorithm only appears to generalize under very special conditions. For example, we must have an algebraic number field whose ring of integers is a Euclidean domain. Furthermore, it seems that the convergence rate can only be guaranteed if the norm function on this field has certain properties.
